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NOTE 
CONTAMINATED JURISPRUDENCE: MUDDY 
CATEGORIES IN ROBINSON TOWNSHIP V. 
COMMONWEALTH  
Ian S. Lamont† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,1 a plurality of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s recently enacted legislative scheme 
for regulating the oil and gas industry, known as Act 13, violated the 
Environmental Rights Amendment (“E.R.A.”) to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. That amendment requires the state government to (a) take into 
account the impact that laws and government activities will have on the 
environment, and (b) to act as the trustee of the state’s natural resources. 
According to the plurality, since hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is 
“undeniably detrimental”2 to the environment, the Pennsylvania legislature 
violated both prongs of the E.R.A. when it passed a law that restricted the 
ability of local municipalities to contain fracking-related activities by means 
of zoning ordinances. Environmental activists as well as legal theorists 
praised the opinion’s novel application of the amendment and its severe 
condemnation of fracking. Other observers, however, have criticized the 
opinion for oversimplifying a complex legal and scientific issue. What cannot 
be disputed is that the case resulted in uncertainty. The concurring opinion 
would have struck down the law on substantive due process grounds. The 
two dissenting opinions argued that the plurality opinion conflated 
legislative and judicial reasoning. However, in finding the statute to be a valid 
exercise of the state’s police power, the dissenting justices applied minimal 
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scrutiny to Act 13. Although many portions of the law were struck down, 
there was no majority rationale. Thus, no one knows whether a future court 
will strike down similar laws on the same grounds as the plurality.  
As a proposed alternative to the approaches taken by the plurality, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions, this Note analyzes portions of Act 13 
according to the principles and methods of judicial review articulated by 
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. 
Maryland. Although those cases were seminal in the development of judicial 
review by the United States Supreme Court, the principles upon which 
Marshall based his rationale are not exclusive to the federal judiciary, but 
instead inhere in the very nature of a constitution. It is thus possible—indeed, 
necessary—for state supreme courts to assess state laws according to the same 
basic analytical framework as federal laws. The Marshall analysis does not 
confuse the difference between legislative and judicial reasoning, like the 
plurality did in Robinson. Nor does it allow the court to fall back on minimal 
scrutiny, like the dissenting opinions did, thereby abdicating its 
responsibility to ensure statutes are in accord with the constitution and 
general principles of law. Furthermore, because Marshall’s analysis takes into 
account general principles of law in evaluating the validity of the statute in 
question, it offers an opportunity to apply a Christian legal philosophy to the 
subject matter of the statute.  
Assessing the constitutionality of Act 13 in its entirety is beyond the scope 
of this Note. Instead, I will demonstrate the Marshall analysis by applying it 
to two sections of the act that the plurality held to have violated the E.R.A. 
While I reach the conclusion that the provisions were not unconstitutional, 
that is almost beside the point, since my aim is to show how Marshall’s 
method of analysis can and must be used in a state law context if we are to 
take seriously the nature and function of a constitution. 
At a general level, this proposed analysis is relevant because it 
demonstrates how consistent, principled judicial reasoning is necessary and 
effective for resolving contemporary disputes at the state level. More 
practically, it is relevant because the proper application of the E.R.A. remains 
uncertain in Pennsylvania, so a future court will have to revisit the questions 
raised in Robinson Township. It is the author’s hope that the justices on that 
future court will make their decision according to general principles of law 
and the framework of our constitutional system.  
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II. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP V. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
A.  Background 
Beneath the wooded hills of the Northeast is the Marcellus Shale, “a black 
shale formation extending deep underground from Ohio and West Virginia 
northeast into Pennsylvania and southern New York.”3 Researchers estimate 
that the formation may contain up to 363 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.4 
When reports first started to circulate about the vast size of this reservoir and 
the potential of accessing it through improved technology, investors and 
energy producers descended on the region to snatch up leases.5  
The rate at which gas has been extracted from the Marcellus Shale has 
exceeded the predictions of industry experts.6 In less than seven years, the 
formation went from yielding just two percent of the U.S. supply of natural 
gas to almost twenty percent. The U.S. Energy Information Institute (“EIA”) 
estimated that by October 2014, the formation would account for nearly a 
quarter of U.S. natural gas production. 7 This extraordinary productivity has 
been an economic boon to a region that has suffered economic decline for 
decades, turning farmers into millionaires in a few short years.8 
Along with the economic rewards, though, have come burdens on local 
infrastructure and concerns that the extraction process might have 
detrimental effects on the environment as well as on local residents’ health 
                                                                                                                                        
 3. See Demographics, WETZEL COUNTY CHAMBER OF COM., 
http://www.wetzelcountychamber.com/demographics_natural_res.html. (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016). 
 4. See Crystal Sarakas, Natural Gas Drilling in the Marcellus Shale, WSKA NEWS (Feb. 9, 
2010), http://wskgnews.org/post/natural-gas-drilling-marcellus-shale#stream/0 (“To put this 
into context, New York State uses about 1.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas a year.”). 
 5. Elwin Green, Natural Gas Locked in the Marcellus Shale has Companies Rushing to Cash in 
on Possibilities, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/business/news/natural-gas-locked-in-the-marcellus-shale-has-companies-
rushing-to-cash-in-on-possibilities-370058/. 
 6. Chris Pedersen, Marcellus Shale Continues to Prove Analysts Wrong, OILPRICE.COM 
(Aug. 17, 2014), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Marcellus-Shale-Continues-to-
Prove-Analysts-Wrong.html. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Rob Wile, Why Letting An Oil Company Frack In Your Backyard Is Actually An 
Awesome Idea, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/if-
you-want-to-become-a-millionaire-let-an-oil-company-frack-your-backyard-2012-10?op=1. 
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and quality of life.9 In some communities, these concerns have spurred 
opposition to hydraulic-fracturing and led to initiatives to prohibit the 
practice.10 Oil and gas extraction and processing activities, however, are 
typically regulated directly by state governments,11 with state oil and gas 
statutes preempting any attempts by local governments to regulate the 
production methods used by energy companies.12 To circumvent this 
preemption, towns and cities turned instead to their zoning ordinances and 
classified a range of heavy industrial uses, “including oil, gas and solution 
mining and drilling,” as conditional or prohibited uses.13 These classifications 
allowed the municipalities to review the given use and to restrict or deny it as 
they saw fit.  
The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act 39 prohibited municipalities from 
using zoning ordinances to completely exclude mining operations, but did 
permit municipalities to regulate the location of mining operations.14 Thus, a 
municipality could restrict the location of mining activity and oil and gas 
drilling, but could not require additional permits or regulate the mining or 
drilling process directly.15 In 2009, a Pennsylvania appellate court held that 
the Oil and Gas Act allowed Nockamixon Township to enforce a zoning 
                                                                                                                                        
 9. Carol French, A Dairy Farmer Shares Her Story About Fracking: “What Have We 
Done?”, PUBLIC HERALD (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.publicherald.org/archives/16845/ 
investigative-reports/energy-investigations/. 
 10. Brendan DeMelle, Pittsburgh Bans Natural Gas Drilling Over Fracking Threat, 
HUFFPOST GREEN (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brendan-
demelle/pittsburgh-bans-natural-g_b_784489.html. 
 11. See, e.g., VA CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.3. 
 12. For instance, Pennsylvania law at one point provided that: 
Except with respect to ordinances adopted pursuant to . . . the act of July 31, 1968 
(P.L. 805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 
and the act of October 4, 1978 (P.L. 851, No. 166), known as the Flood Plain 
Management Act, all local ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate oil 
and gas well operations regulated by this act are hereby superseded. No 
ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the aforementioned acts shall 
contain provisions which impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the 
same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by this act or that 
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in this act. The Commonwealth, by 
this enactment, hereby preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas 
wells as herein defined.  
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (repealed 2014) (citations omitted). 
 13. Matter of Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1193 (N.Y. 2014). 
 14. Joshua P. Fershee, Facts, Fiction, and Perception in Hydraulic Fracturing: Illuminating 
Act 13 and Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 829, 
827 (2014). 
 15. Id. 
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ordinance that permitted oil and gas drilling only in specified zones since the 
“challenged provisions are part of the land use process and not unique 
operational regulations that become pertinent only after land use approval is 
granted.”16 The local ordinances, therefore, did not impermissibly “regulate 
the operation of oil and gas drilling in the Township in addition to location 
and physical configuration.”17 In contrast, in the same year, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the Oil and Gas Act did preclude local 
municipalities from regulating oil and gas operations that were already 
covered.18  
This patchwork of local ordinances across the Marcellus Shale region of 
the Commonwealth posed a significant challenge to the energy companies 
engaged in natural gas exploration as the natural gas boom proceeded.19 
Desiring to ensure continued development of the Marcellus Shale, the 
Pennsylvania legislature revoked the Oil and Gas Act and passed House Bill 
1959, commonly referred to as “Act 13.”20 Thus, in large part, Act 13 was a 
response by state legislators to complaints by oil and gas companies about 
inconsistent local practices and requirements concerning oil and gas 
production.21 The expansive law included new regulations related to the 
operation of gas wells, imposed levies on new gas wells, and provided for the 
distribution of impact fees to local governments.22 Act 13, however, also 
prohibited local governments from enacting environmental laws and zoning 
code provisions related to oil and gas operations,23 expressly preempting 
nearly all local regulation, and sparing only certain setbacks.24  
It is against this background that the case of Robinson Township v. 
Commonwealth arose.25 The petitioners—a group of seven municipalities, a 
non-profit environmental organization, and a doctor (collectively, the 
“citizens”)26—challenged the constitutionality of Act 13 in the 
                                                                                                                                        
 16. Arbor Res. L.L.C. v. Nockamixon Twp., 973 A.2d 1036, 1046 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Range Res. - Appalachia L.L.C. v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa. 2009). 
 19. See generally Blaine A. Lucas, Survey of recent Pennsylvania municipal ordinance 
activity impacting the development of the Marcellus Shale play, PIOGA PRESS (Pa. Indep. Oil & 
Gas Ass’n), http://www.babstcalland.com/articles/PiogaPressOctober2011Lucas.pdf. 
 20. Fershee, supra note 14, at 838. 
 21. Id. at 827.  
 22. Id. at 828.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
 26. Id. at 914, n.3 (plurality defending its choice of words). 
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Commonwealth Court in March of 2012.27 Among other requests, the 
petitioners filed a fourteen-count petition for review in which they requested 
a declaration that Act 13 was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction 
against application of the Act.28 The citizens argued that Act 13 violated five 
sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution, namely, article I, section 
1 (reciting inherent rights of mankind); article I, section 10 (as it pertains 
to eminent domain); article I, section 27 (the “Environmental Rights 
Amendment”); article III, section 3 (pertaining to single subject bills); 
and article III, section 32 (as it pertains to special laws).29 The citizens further 
claimed that Act 13 was unconstitutionally vague, and that it violated the 
separation of powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution.30 
In ruling on the parties’ preliminary objections and cross-motions for 
summary relief, the en banc panel of the court enjoined enforcement of 
sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304 of Act 13, along with other sections that 
enforced section 3304.31 The injunction effectively permitted local 
governments to enforce existing zoning ordinances and adopt new 
ordinances that would contravene the Act 13 regulatory scheme. The court 
reasoned: 
[b]ecause 58 Pa. C.S. §3304 requires all oil and gas operations [to 
be permitted] in all zoning districts, including residential districts, 
as a matter of law, we hold that 58 Pa. C.S. §3304 violates 
substantive due process because it allows incompatible uses in 
zoning districts and does not protect the interests of neighboring 
property owners from harm, alters the character of the 
neighborhood, and makes irrational classifications.32 
The injunction also effectively prohibited the Department of Environmental 
Protection from granting waivers of mandatory setbacks from waters of the 
Commonwealth.33 
The commonwealth court dismissed the balance of the citizens’ claims.34 
Most significant to the subject of this Note, the court sustained the 
                                                                                                                                        
 27. Id. at 915. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 915-16. 
 30. Id. at 916. 
 31. Id. at 930. 
 32. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 485 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
 33. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 930.  
 34. Id. 
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Commonwealth’s preliminary objection to the citizens’ contention that parts 
of Act 13 violated the Environmental Rights Amendment.35  
In a flurry of cross-appeals,36 the Commonwealth supported the 
affirmance of the commonwealth court’s decision on all counts except for its 
holding that section 3215(b)(4) and sections 3304 through 3309 were 
unconstitutional. The citizens, for their part, offered additional reasons and 
theories in support of the claim that the other provisions of Act 13—indeed 
the entire act—were unconstitutional, bringing the total number of issues on 
appeal to fourteen.37  
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed at length the 
issue of whether the various petitioners had standing to bring suit.38 This 
Note, however, will focus on the court’s primary concern: the 
constitutionality of Act 13.  
B.  Plurality Opinion 
In the plurality decision, Justice Castille limited himself to neither the 
commonwealth court’s rationale, nor the primary arguments made by the 
parties. Instead of focusing on the due process issues raised by the zoning and 
agency discretion provisions of Act 13, the plurality justices went deeper.39 
They announced that: 
at its core, this dispute centers upon an asserted vindication of 
citizens’ rights to quality of life on their properties and in their 
hometowns, insofar as Act 13 threatens degradation of air and 
water, and of natural, scenic, and esthetic values of the 
environment, with attendant effects on heath, safety, and the 
owners’ continued enjoyment of their private property.40  
The dispositive issue, therefore, was the very constitutionality of Act 13, 
under article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution: the 
Environmental Rights Amendment.41  
                                                                                                                                        
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 916. 
 37. Id. at 916-930. 
 38. Id. at 916-930. 
 39. Id. at 942. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
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1. The Constitutionality of Act 13 
In setting out the standard of review for evaluating Act 13, the plurality 
noted that the issue was purely a question of law, and thus the court could 
review the commonwealth court’s decision de novo.42 Since the matter 
centered on a statute, the analysis had to begin with the presumption that the 
General Assembly did not intend to violate the Constitution.43 Thus, any 
doubts were resolved in favor of finding the statute constitutional.44 
Moreover, the plurality stated that its decision would be based on the 
construction and application of the E.R.A., so the actual language of the 
amendment would be controlling, and would be interpreted “as understood 
by the people when they voted on its adoption.”45  
The plurality then described the constitutional paradigm for the E.R.A. 
and the consequent framework for analyzing the constitutionality of Act 13.46 
After reciting the fundamentals of a state constitutional system, such as the 
constitutional grant of plenary authority to the legislature to exercise broad 
police powers, the plurality described the role of Article I of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. Article I, the Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights, 
“delineates the terms of the social contract between government and the 
people that are of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced 
as ‘inviolate.’”47 Among these rights, which are “inherent in man’s nature and 
preserved rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution,”48 are those 
found in the E.R.A., which states:  
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.49 
The plurality acknowledged that the task of discerning judicial standards 
in the sphere of constitutional rights is a difficult one.50 Compounding this 
                                                                                                                                        
 42. Id. at 943.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. (citation omitted).  
 46. Id. at 946. 
 47. Id. at 947 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, Preamble & § 25). 
 48. Id. at 948. 
 49. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 50. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 949. 
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inherent challenge was the development of the jurisprudence relating to the 
E.R.A. in particular.51 
The plurality identified two primary goals in the E.R.A.: (1) to prevent the 
state from infringing on certain rights identified in the amendment, and (2) 
to establish a “nascent framework for the Commonwealth to participate 
affirmatively in the development and enforcement of these rights.”52A cause 
of action arising under the E.R.A., therefore, could use one or both of two 
theories: (1) that the state encroached upon citizen’s individual rights, or (2) 
that the state failed to perform its duties as trustee.53  
a. Individual Environmental Rights 
The first clause of the E.R.A. is prohibitory. This affirmative right of the 
people to “clean air and pure water, and to the preservation of natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment” is a limitation on the state’s 
power to act in a way that compromises that “right.”54 Although the E.R.A. 
refers generally to the “people,” the plurality construed the right as a 
guarantee to each citizen.55 Furthermore, though the clause does not require 
the political branches to take any specific actions to promote the 
environmental rights, it does require each branch of government—at both 
state and local levels—to “consider in advance of proceeding the 
environmental effect of any proposed action on the constitutionally 
protected features.”56 Likewise, the judicial branch is required to “vindicate” 
E.R.A. rights, and has the authority to fashion appropriate remedies toward 
that end.57 Recognizing that cleanness of air and purity of water are relative, 
not absolute, qualities, the plurality noted that the courts would look to 
“agency expertise” to determine whether the standards were being met.58 
Nevertheless, a court’s “benchmark” must be the “express purpose” of the 
E.R.A.: to hold back “actual or likely degradation” of the quality of air, water, 
etc.59 In addition, the E.R.A. requires the “preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment.”60 According to the plurality, 
                                                                                                                                        
 51. Id. at 950. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 951. 
 55. Id. at n.39. 
 56. Id. at 952. 
 57. Id. at 952-53. 
 58. Id. at 953. 
 59. Id. 
 60. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.  
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this means that state and local government action must take into account the 
“environmental features of the affected locale” in order to be constitutional.61  
The plurality next addressed the intersection of environmental rights with 
economic and property rights. As a constitutional provision “on par with” 
other provisions in Article 1, the E.R.A. and the rights contained therein must 
be balanced against other fundamental rights, including those protecting 
private property.62 The plurality emphasized that the E.R.A. does not reflect 
an intent on the part of the legislators or voters to “deprive persons of the use 
of their property” or “derail” beneficial development.63 Nevertheless, the 
E.R.A. does require that any property use and economic development be 
sustainable, and not be carried out in a way that unreasonably degrades the 
environment.64 Exercises of state police power must likewise promote 
sustainability.65  
b.  The Public Trust 
The second and third clauses of the E.R.A. delineate the state’s trusteeship 
of “public natural resources.”66 This malleable category encompasses the full 
array of resources that implicate the public interest, as defined by statute or 
common law.67 Examples include “state-owned lands, waterways, and 
mineral reserves;” as well as interests beyond the scope of private property, 
such as surface and ground water and wild flora and fauna.68 The third clause 
entrusts these resources to “the Commonwealth,” and names the people as 
beneficiaries.69 As the trustee, the state has both negative and affirmative 
duties.70 To illumine the specialized concepts of “trust” and “trustee” as they 
applied at the time the amendment was passed, the plurality quoted from the 
E.R.A.’s legislative history: “Under the trust theory, [the government] deals 
with its citizens as a fiduciary, measuring its successes by the benefits it 
bestows upon all its citizens in their utilization of natural resources under 
law.”71 The trust relationship gives the trustee broad, but not unlimited 
                                                                                                                                        
 61. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 953. 
 62. Id. at 953-54. 
 63. Id. at 954. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 955.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 956. 
 70. Id. at 955. 
 71. Id. at 956. 
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discretion, which is subject to control by the settlor.72 As the common owners 
of the Commonwealth’s natural resources, the people of Pennsylvania—who 
are both the settlors and the named beneficiaries—created the environmental 
public trust.73 Since “the Commonwealth” was named as trustee, the E.R.A. 
trustee powers were not vested solely in one branch of the government but 
apportioned among the branches according to the usual division of power.74  
According to the plurality, the E.R.A.’s environmental public trust entails 
both explicit and implicit obligations. The explicit obligations are to 
“conserve and maintain” the “corpus of the trust,” i.e., the public natural 
resources.75 This entails preventing and remedying the “degradation, 
diminution, or depletion” of the resources.76 The plurality included within 
the explicit obligations the fiduciary duties of “prudence, loyalty, and 
impartiality.”77  
The plurality found two separate obligations as implicit in the nature of 
the trust relationship.78 The first is negative, or prohibitory, and the second 
is affirmative. The first obligation is that the Commonwealth has a duty to 
“refrain from performing its trustee duties respecting the environment 
unreasonably,” which applies to both legislative enactments and executive 
acts. 79  It requires the Commonwealth to refrain from directly causing harm 
to the natural resources in its care, and also from indirectly causing harm by 
permitting third parties to do so.80 The second obligation arising from the 
trustee-beneficiary relationship is the duty to “act affirmatively to protect the 
environment, via legislative action.”81 The plurality recited a number of 
instances in which the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed legislation in 
furtherance of this obligation. Notable examples were the Clean Streams Act, 
the Air Pollution Act, and the Solid Waste Management Act.82 These detailed 
regulatory enactments were necessary to give effect to a “great ordinance” 
like the E.R.A., which contains only general, unarticulated terms.83 On the 
                                                                                                                                        
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 957. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 958. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
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other hand, the fact that these statutes gave effect to the broad constitutional 
rights does not preclude citizens from bringing suit to independently enforce 
and defend those rights.84 As in its discussion of the individual rights clause 
of the E.R.A., the plurality emphasized that the “conserve and maintain” 
standards are meant to promote sustainable development, not hamper it.85 
The plurality identified two implications of the beneficiary status of “all 
the people” of the Commonwealth.86 The first is the necessity for the trustee 
to “deal impartially” with respect to all beneficiaries.87 The second is 
intergenerational: a duty to “balance the interests of present and future 
beneficiaries.”88 “[T]his aspect of [s]ection 27 recognizes the practical reality 
that environmental changes, whether positive or negative, have the potential 
to be incremental, have a compounding effect, and develop over 
generations.”89 The E.R.A., therefore, “offers protection equally against 
actions with immediate severe impact on public natural resources and against 
actions with minimal or insignificant present consequences that are actually 
or likely to have significant or irreversible effects in the short or long term.”90 
2.  Historical Context of the Environmental Rights Amendment 
Next, the plurality addressed the statutory construction of the E.R.A., 
including the object of the provision, the harm it was intended to remedy, 
and the legislative history and circumstances of enactment.91 The court 
identified three main environmental events that, after a century and a half of 
industrial activity, led the Pennsylvania legislature to gradually adopt 
environmental protection measures, and ultimately led to the enactment of 
the E.R.A. First, by the 1920s, the logging industry had deforested vast 
                                                                                                                                        
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 959. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Few other states address environmental protection or conservation in their state 
constitutions at all, and even fewer actually enumerate the people’s environmental rights in 
their Bill or Declaration of Rights. Id. at 962. Some states, at most, express policy directives in 
their constitution to guide legislative decision-making. According to the court, Pennsylvania’s 
constitution stands virtually alone in its imposition of duties that require both responsive and 
anticipatory action for the protection of the environment. Id. at 963. The court attributes this 
unique stance to the Commonwealth’s long experience with environmental exploitation and 
its multi-generational consequences. Id.  
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portions of the state and left the landscape bare.92 Second, deforestation, 
pollution, and lax regulation of hunting, trapping, and fishing drastically had 
diminished the state’s wild game population.93 Finally, the coal and steel 
industries had inflicted devastating effects on the quality of soil, water, and 
air in the mining regions of the state.94 With these events, and their 
devastating costs still fresh in their “collective memory,” both houses of the 
General Assembly unanimously approved the proposed amendment in two 
separate legislative sessions.95 Likewise, when the amendment was put to the 
citizens of the Commonwealth, the voters approved it by a margin of nearly 
four to one.96 
Without offering any specific examples, the court noted that legislative 
enactments and executive agency actions previously had been the primary 
means for realizing the E.R.A.’s mandate.97 There had not yet been an 
opportunity for the judiciary to resolve the question of how the E.R.A. might 
“restrain the exercise of police power by the government.”98 Likewise, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet had occasion to “address the 
original understanding of the constitutional provision.”99 The court’s 
jurisprudence with respect to Article 27 historically fell into two lines of cases, 
which arose in two types of factual scenarios: (1) private or governmental 
projects that allegedly violated environmental rights, and (2) state or local 
environmental regulations that allegedly violated private property rights.100 
Further, the court’s prior jurisprudence did not take the first step of 
determining whether the people’s rights had been violated, or instead 
whether the state had failed to perform its duty as trustee.101  
Ultimately, the plurality found that neither line of cases addressed a 
situation like the one in the case before it.102 Lacking in both lines was a 
                                                                                                                                        
 92. Id. at 960. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 961. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 962. 
 97. Id. at 963-64. 
 98. Id. at 964. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. The plurality’s primary contention with the first line of cases—those involving 
challenges to projects allegedly violating environmental rights—was over whether the E.R.A. 
is self-executing. In Payne v. Kassab, the commonwealth court essentially answered “no” and 
reduced the inquiry to a balancing test. Under the Payne test, any relief under the E.R.A. 
required a consideration of three factors:  
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definitive role for the judiciary in applying the amendment and developing 
its own “environmental rights jurisprudence comparable to the tradition of 
political rights jurisprudence.” 103 This, according to the court, was contrary 
to the drafters’ intentions and, thus, the court had a duty to “vindicate the 
rights of its citizens.”104 
3.  Contested Provisions of Act 13 
Having set out its framework for analysis under the E.R.A., the plurality 
then applied that analysis to the challenged provisions of Act 13.105 Before 
addressing specific sections, however, the court made comments about the 
Act as a whole. First, the court contrasted the divergent applications of the 
E.R.A. to Act 13 made by the Commonwealth and by the citizens. The 
Commonwealth’s perspective was that Act 13 had been enacted according to 
legitimate objectives and “falls properly within its exclusive discretionary 
policy judgment.”106 Municipalities, therefore, had no right to challenge that 
                                                                                                                                        
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statues and regulations relevant to 
the protection of the Commonwealth’s public natural resource? (2) Does the 
record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to 
a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the 
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived 
therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?  
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 966 (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1973)). This analysis became the “benchmark” for the commonwealth court’s E.R.A. decisions, 
despite the fact that it is not based on the constitutional text. The Robinson Township plurality 
gave three reasons for why the Payne test was inadequate for the majority of cases implicating 
the E.R.A.: (1) it is too narrow in its description of the Commonwealth’s duties, (2) it assumes 
that no judicial relief is available under the amendment unless there has been some kind of 
legislative action, and (3) it has “the effect of minimizing the constitutional duties of executive 
agencies and the judicial branch, and circumscribing the abilities of these entities to carry out 
their constitutional duties independent of legislative control.” Id. at 967.  
  The court looked more favorably on the second line of cases applying the E.R.A. In 
those cases, the supreme court had cited the amendment to demonstrate the state’s public 
policy in favor of environmental protection as opposed to other Article I interests, such as 
property or economic rights. Id. at 967-968. According to the court, this line of cases supports 
an interpretation of the E.R.A. that requires the state to “act in a manner that protects 
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources from degradation and diminution.” Id. at 969. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Since the purpose of this Note is to illustrate the application of the Marshall Analysis 
to state statutes, it is unnecessary to examine each section of Act 13 with which the court dealt. 
Thus, I have passed over other sections dealt with by the court in order to focus on the primary 
two offending sections.  
 106. Id. at 974. 
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judgment or attempt to adopt a different policy.107 The citizens, on the other 
hand, viewed the E.R.A. as imposing the duty on the Commonwealth’s 
political branches to protect individual rights.108 It likewise gave citizens the 
ability to vindicate those rights in court in the event the Commonwealth 
breached its duty.109 Thus, the issue was not about the power of 
municipalities, but about the Commonwealth’s faithfulness in performing its 
duties under the E.R.A.110 The court unequivocally agreed with the citizens.111  
Next, the court addressed the purpose of Act 13. Citing the “Declaration 
of Purpose” section of Act 13,112 the court described the purpose of the Act to 
be “to provide a maximally favorable environment for industry operators to 
exploit Pennsylvania’s oil and gas resources, including those in the Marcellus 
Shale Formation.”113 Like the coal industry before it, the natural gas industry 
was seeking to exploit the natural resources of Pennsylvania at the expense of 
the environment and to the detriment of future generations. But, unlike in 
the earlier era, there was a constitutional means of ensuring that history 
would not be repeated: the E.R.A.114 The court then proceeded to examine 
the individual provisions of the challenged statute. 
The first section of Act 13 that the court addresses is § 3303, which states: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, environmental 
acts are of Statewide concern and, to the extent that they regulate 
                                                                                                                                        
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202. 
 113. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 975. In framing the purpose in this way, the court very 
selectively quotes § 3202, including only the phrase “optimal development of oil and gas 
resources.” The full section reads:  
The purposes of this chapter are to: 
(1) Permit optimal development of oil and gas resources of this 
Commonwealth consistent with protection of the health, safety, environment 
and property of Pennsylvania citizens. 
(2) Protect the safety of personnel and facilities employed in coal mining or 
exploration, development, storage and production of natural gas or oil. 
(3) Protect the safety and property rights of persons residing in areas where 
mining, exploration, development, storage or production occurs. 
(4) Protect the natural resources, environmental rights and values secured by 
the Constitution of Pennsylvania. 
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202 (emphasis added). 
 114. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 976. 
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oil and gas operations, occupy the entire field of regulation, to the 
exclusion of all local ordinances. The Commonwealth by this 
section, preempts and supersedes the local regulation of oil and 
gas operations regulated by the environmental acts, as provided in 
this chapter.115 
To determine the constitutionality of this section, the court considered the 
basic relation of local municipalities to the state government and their 
respective duties under the constitution. Fundamentally, local municipalities 
derive their authority solely from the Commonwealth.116 The constitution or 
the General Assembly may expressly grant power, and the municipality may 
have implicit authority to execute those powers.117 The General Assembly, 
however, does not have the authority to strip a municipality of its power to 
perform the municipality’s constitutional duties.118 According to the court, 
the latter principle becomes relevant in the context of the E.R.A. The 
Commonwealth—the trustee named in the E.R.A.—encompasses not only 
the General Assembly but also local municipalities. Local governments, 
therefore, have a fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the E.R.A., which is 
not mediated through the General Assembly. The General Assembly, 
therefore, may not relieve the municipalities of that duty.119 Since the local 
zoning ordinances predated Act 13, “citizens buying homes and raising 
families in areas zoned residential had a reasonable expectation concerning 
the environment in which they were living . . . .”120 By completely superseding 
local ordinances and ordering localities to ignore their existing use 
restrictions, Act 13 “fundamentally disrupt[ed]” the expectation of those 
citizens. Moreover, such a sweeping preemption forced local governments to 
ignore their independent obligations under the E.R.A. to take affirmative 
measures for environmental protection.121 The court, therefore, held that § 
3303 was unconstitutional because it overstepped the bounds of its police 
power.122  
The plurality similarly dispensed with § 3304.123 The section violated the 
E.R.A. because it degraded the corpus of the Commonwealth’s trust and 
                                                                                                                                        
 115. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303. 
 116. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 978. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Section 3304 provides: 
2016] CONTAMINATED JURISPRUDENCE 517 
 
                                                                                                                                        
(a) General rule. -- In addition to the restrictions contained in sections 3302 
(relating to oil and gas operations regulated pursuant to Chapter 32) and 3303 
(relating to oil and gas operations regulated by environmental acts), all local 
ordinances regulating oil and gas operations shall allow for the reasonable 
development of oil and gas resources. 
(b) Reasonable development of oil and gas resources. -- In order to allow . . . for 
the reasonable development of oil and gas resources, a local ordinance: 
(1) Shall allow well and pipeline location assessment operations, including 
seismic operations and related activities conducted in accordance with all 
applicable Federal and State laws and regulations relating to the storage and 
use of explosives throughout every local government. 
(2) May not impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the 
construction of oil and gas operations that are more stringent than 
conditions, requirements or limitations imposed on construction activities 
for other industrial uses within the geographic boundaries of the local 
government. 
(3) May not impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the heights of 
structures, screening and fencing, lighting or noise relating to permanent oil 
and gas operations that are more stringent than the conditions, requirements 
or limitations imposed on other industrial uses or other land development 
within the particular zoning district where the oil and gas operations are 
situated within the local government. 
(4) Shall have a review period for permitted uses that does not exceed 30 days 
for complete submissions or that does not exceed 120 days for conditional 
uses. 
(5) Shall authorize oil and gas operations, other than activities at 
impoundment areas, compressor stations and processing plants, as a 
permitted use in all zoning districts. 
(5.1) Notwithstanding section 3215 (relating to well location restrictions), 
may prohibit, or permit only as a conditional use, wells or well sites otherwise 
permitted under paragraph (5) within a residential district if the well site 
cannot be placed so that the wellhead is at least 500 feet from any existing 
building. In a residential district, all of the following apply: 
(i) A well site may not be located so that the outer edge of the well pad is closer 
than 300 feet from an existing building. 
(ii) Except as set forth in paragraph (5) and this paragraph, oil and gas 
operations, other than the placement, use and repair of oil and gas pipelines, 
water pipelines, access roads or security facilities, may not take place within 
300 feet of an existing building. 
(6) Shall authorize impoundment areas used for oil and gas operations as a 
permitted use in all zoning districts, provided that the edge of any 
impoundment area shall not be located closer than 300 feet from an existing 
building. 
(7) Shall authorize natural gas compressor stations as a permitted use in 
agricultural and industrial zoning districts and as a conditional use in all other 
zoning districts, if the natural gas compressor building meets the following 
standards: 
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imposed a disparate impact on some citizens.124 Section 3304 implements a 
new regulatory regime for oil and gas operations, which supersedes all local 
ordinances.125 The section requires municipalities to permit a wide range of 
activities and limits the ability of the local government to place restrictions.126 
Since § 3304 “permits industrial oil and gas operations as a uses ‘of right’ in 
every zoning district throughout the Commonwealth,” the plurality found 
that it could not meet the needs of the wide range of natural and social 
conditions represented in different parts of Pennsylvania, and that it would 
disrupt the expectations and ownership interests that had developed over 
three centuries of history.127 The court posited that such inflexibility would 
expose sensitive landscapes to industrial noise, traffic, and pollution. 
                                                                                                                                        
(i) is located 750 feet or more from the nearest existing building or 200 feet 
from the nearest lot line, whichever is greater, unless waived by the owner of 
the building or adjoining lot; and 
(ii) the noise level does not exceed a noise standard of 60dbA at the nearest 
property line or the applicable standard imposed by Federal law, whichever 
is less. 
(8) Shall authorize a natural gas processing plant as a permitted use in an 
industrial zoning district and as conditional uses in agricultural zoning 
districts if all of the following apply: 
(i) The natural gas processing plant building is located at the greater of at least 
750 feet from the nearest existing building or at least 200 feet from the nearest 
lot line unless waived by the owner of the building or adjoining lot. 
(ii) The noise level of the natural gas processing plant building does not 
exceed a noise standard of 60dbA at the nearest property line or the applicable 
standard imposed by Federal law, whichever is less. 
(9) Shall impose restrictions on vehicular access routes for overweight 
vehicles only as authorized under 75 Pa.C.S.. (relating to vehicles) or the 
MPC. 
(10) May not impose limits or conditions on subterranean operations or 
hours of operation of compressor stations and processing plants or hours of 
operation for the drilling of oil and gas wells or the assembly and disassembly 
of drilling rigs. 
(11) May not increase setback distances set forth in Chapter 32 (relating to 
development) or this chapter. A local ordinance may impose setback 
distances that are not regulated by or set forth in Chapter 32 or this chapter 
if the setbacks are no more stringent than those for other industrial uses 
within the geographic boundaries of the local government. 
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 invalidated by Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 
(Pa. 2013). 
 124. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 981. 
 125. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304. 
 126. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b). 
 127. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979 (emphasis in original). 
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Additionally, it would fundamentally alter aesthetic values that communities 
have come to rely upon.128 “In constitutional terms,” this amounted to a 
degradation of the corpus of the trust.129  
The broad-brush approach taken by § 3304 was also the cause of the 
plurality’s other concern: the new regulatory scheme had a greater 
environmental impact on some communities than on others. Section 3304 
imposed “conditions, requirements or limitations” applicable in every zoning 
district in every part of the Commonwealth, and it prohibited localities from 
tailoring their own regulations to meet the specific needs of each district.130 
The application of this statute would mean that even the most sensitive 
zoning district must permit industrial oil and gas production activities, 
regardless of the zone’s actual conditions. Thus, a sensitive zoning district 
would suffer a greater burden on its environmental conditions as a result of 
the statute than would a district already zoned for heavy industry.131 Since the 
E.R.A. commands the Commonwealth as trustee to manage the corpus of the 
trust for the benefit of “all the people,” the plurality held this disparate impact 
on sensitive zoning districts to be unconstitutional.132  
C.  Justice Baer’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Baer lauded the “pioneering opinion” of Chief Justice Castille,133 
but agreed with the commonwealth court’s decision that the challenged 
portions of Act 13 were unconstitutional primarily on Due Process 
grounds.134 Justice Baer premised his opinion on the notion that states have 
a “constitutionally ordained mandate” to enact zoning laws under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.135 According 
to Justice Baer, the prohibition against government takings of property 
embodied in those amendments, combined with the common law principle 
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,136 requires the state to provide for 
                                                                                                                                        
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 980. 
 130. Id. at 980. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J. concurring). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 1001-02. 
 136. “Use your own property in such a way that you do not injure other people’s.” sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas, OXFORD REFERENCE, available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563# (last viewed 
Feb. 2, 2016). 
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zoning ordinances so that the obnoxious land use of one landowner does not 
harm the interests of his neighbor.137 With that assumption as a starting 
point, Justice Baer framed the issue at hand: “May the General Assembly, 
through a law applicable statewide, remove en toto from local municipalities 
the apparatus it provided to vindicate the individual substantive due process 
rights of Pennsylvania landowners?”138 Justice Baer said “no.”139 Because Act 
13 took a “one size fits all” approach,140 the law contravened one of the 
fundamental principles of constitutional zoning schemes in that it had “an 
arbitrary and discriminatory impact” on different landowners in different 
parts of the state.141 The Commonwealth made it impossible for the local 
governments to protect the interests of landowners against the 
“unquestionable damage to their private enjoyment of property.”142 The 
protections that Act 13 did provide were, in Justice Baer’s view, insufficient 
and ultimately so arbitrary and discriminatory that they essentially forced 
municipalities to invite pigs into every parlor.143 
D.  Dissenting Opinions 
Justices Eakin and Saylor dissented on grounds that the court’s review of 
a political branch’s social policy should have been “highly deferential and 
closely constrained.”144 Justice Saylor, whose opinion Justice Eakin joined in 
its entirety,145 criticized the plurality opinion for straying from the record and 
from the parties’ arguments by making “broad-scale pronouncements” about 
the General Assembly’s disregard for the Environmental Rights 
Amendment.146  
                                                                                                                                        
 137. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001-02. 
 138. Id. at 1002. 
 139. Id. at 1002-03.  
 140. Id. at 1006. 
 141. Id. at 1006-07. 
 142. Id. at 1008. It is important to note that although this argument is similar to that made 
by the plurality, Justice Baer grounds his reasoning in the United States Constitution, and not 
on the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 1009-10. 
 145. Id. at 1014.  
 146. Id. at 1009. 
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III. PROPOSED ANALYSIS 
A.  Introduction 
The plurality opinion takes Pennsylvania’s constitution very seriously by 
endeavoring to give effect to the Environmental Rights Amendment. That 
much is commendable. What is less salutary is the plurality’s failure to fully 
recognize the structural relationship between the commonwealth’s 
legislature and its municipalities—which is that of creator and creature. 
Furthermore, under the guise of enforcing the terms of a trust—the E.R.A.—
the plurality focused on the assumed effects that Act 13 would have on the 
environment. This focus was more in the nature of a legislature rather than a 
court. This part of the Note will show how both of these errors stem from a 
wrong understanding of what a constitution is and what a court’s role is in 
applying it. It will also describe and apply the Marshall analysis to show how 
this alternative approach to constitutional interpretation can be used in a 
state law context.  
1.  Nature of a Constitution 
Before determining whether a law is constitutional, it is necessary to 
consider the nature of a constitution. This consideration entails defining two 
aspects of a constitution: what it is and what it does. How one defines these 
two aspects will be decisive in how that person assesses and passes judgment 
on the statute in question. Chief Justice John Marshall set out a classic 
formulation of these considerations in Marbury v. Madison,147 and this Note 
adopts his definitions.  
According to Justice Marshall, a constitution is an expression of the 
people’s original will. This is a more fundamental and permanent expression 
of will than any statute passed by a legislature.148 Thus, while statutes do 
manifest the will of the people as expressed through the acts of their elected 
representatives, statutes must always be subservient to and limited by the 
original expression of will.149 A change to this fundamental expression of will 
demands a much stricter process than that required for ordinary 
legislation.150  
As to the function of a constitution, Justice Marshall described it as setting 
up the basic framework of government. It “organizes the government, and 
assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop 
                                                                                                                                        
 147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 148. Id. at 176. 
 149. Id. at 176-77. 
 150. Id. at 177. 
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here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those 
departments.”151 Of course, as Justice Marshall notes later in the same 
passage, the U.S. Constitution does establish additional limits on the federal 
government; limits on Congress, on the Judiciary, and on the Executive. 
What a constitution does not—indeed cannot—do is grant fundamental 
rights, though it may enumerate some of those rights. 
2.  Judicial Review 
In Marbury, Justice Marshall famously described the process of judicial 
review. What is perhaps less widely acknowledged is the fact that Justice 
Marshall’s approach to judicial review is part of his theory of the nature of a 
constitution as described above, and is dependent on it.152 Indeed, his view is 
that a court derives its power to strike down statutes from the superior 
position a constitution holds over ordinary legislation.153 Using the 
Constitution as a measuring stick, as it were, the Judiciary has the power to 
say which legislative acts qualify as law and which fall short. As between the 
Constitution and a statute, a court must apply the Constitution; a law that 
does not accord with the Constitution is not law and does not bind courts.154 
3.  Legislative Power 
Fundamental to our system of representative democracy—and indeed to 
a Christian philosophy of authority—is the principle that no person or 
government has power unless it has been delegated by the sovereign.155 
Congress, thus, has only the power delegated to it by the People in the 
Constitution. This principle is the basis for Chief Justice Marshall’s approach 
                                                                                                                                        
 151. Id. at 176. 
 152. Id. at 176-78. 
 153. Id. at 177-78. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., John 19:11 (ESV) (“Jesus answered him, ’You would have no authority over 
me at all unless it had been given you from above.’”), THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the 
solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow 
immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (“There is no position which 
depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor 
of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to 
the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than 
his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are 
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what 
their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.”). 
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to assessing the constitutionality of congressional legislation, as he described 
it in the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland.156 Marshall wrote: 
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures 
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, 
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objects not intrusted [sic] to the government; 
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case 
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act 
was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, 
and [is] calculated to effect [the] objects intrusted [sic] to the 
government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its 
necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the 
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court 
disclaims all pretensions to such a power.157 
As explicated by Dean Jeffrey Tuomala, Justice Marshall’s path of analysis 
examines both the subject matter of the statute and the purpose for which it 
was enacted.158 A statute may be found unconstitutional either because it 
deals with a subject matter that the Constitution has prohibited Congress 
from addressing (i.e., the establishment of religion), or because the law has 
been passed, explicitly or implicitly, for an illegitimate purpose. An object 
may be illegitimate either because it was not granted to Congress by the 
Constitution (i.e., a government function reserved to the states or the 
people), or because it is not a valid purpose for governmental involvement in 
the first place (i.e., the education of children, to use a controversial example). 
4.  Difference between Federal and State Analysis 
It is important to note at this point that, while the nature of a constitution 
remains the same whether it is a state or federal constitution, each type of 
constitution grants a different kind of power. In the American system, the 
Federal Government is one of enumerated powers, whereas the state 
                                                                                                                                        
 156. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 157. Id. at 423. 
 158. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, The Casebook Companion Pt. Three: Ch. 2, p. 9 (2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Identifying the subject of a statute and 
defining the language of an enumerated power is a necessary first step in constitutional 
analysis; however, discerning the object is the lost key in analyzing an enumerated-power 
case.”). Dean Tuomala was the founding Associate Dean for Academic Affairs of the Liberty 
University School of Law, and currently teaches courses on constitutional law, legal history, 
and jurisprudence. I may never have come to law school had I not encountered Dean and Mrs. 
Tuomala at a conference in 2009. 
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governments possess plenary power.159 This difference has a crucial impact 
on how a court should evaluate the constitutionality of a state law. Because 
the state’s authority is not limited to powers enumerated in the state 
constitution, it is usually not necessary to tie a state statute to any enumerated 
power, as is necessary at the federal level. The emphasis in the analysis is on 
determining whether there is an explicit or implicit prohibition against the 
legislative action in the state or federal constitutions, or in the law of nature 
and of Nature’s God. State jurisdiction, therefore, has a much broader range 
of subject matters to regulate than does Congress, but it is still limited to 
regulating only those objects which are entrusted to civil government and not 
withheld by the state or federal constitutions.  
B. Application of Framework 
This Note will now apply the framework set out above to two of the 
sections of Act 13 that the plurality held to be unconstitutional. The first 
section of Act 13 addressed by the court was § 3303, which preempts all local 
environmental ordinances to the extent that they regulate oil and gas 
operations.160 Section 3304 establishes uniformity of local ordinances 
throughout the Commonwealth and requires all local ordinances to permit 
the “reasonable development of oil and gas resources.”161 The balance of 
section 3304 defines what the legislature means by “reasonable 
development.”162 The statute prescribes detailed specifications for what local 
ordinances “shall allow” or “may not” restrict or prohibit: setback distances, 
a review period, impoundment areas, etc. are required, but municipalities are 
forbidden from enacting ordinances that are more stringent than those which 
cover other industrial uses.163  
                                                                                                                                        
 159. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 (“This government is acknowledged by all, to be 
one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, 
would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its 
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that 
principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers 
actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our 
system shall exist.”). 
 160. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 (“Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, 
environmental acts are of Statewide concern and, to the extent that they regulate oil and gas 
operations, occupy the entire field of regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances. The 
Commonwealth by this section, preempts and supersedes the local regulation of oil and gas 
operations regulated by the environmental acts, as provided in this chapter.”). 
 161. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(a). 
 162. 58 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b). 
 163. Id.  
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The subject matter of both sections is the removal of a particular field of 
regulation—aspects of the oil and gas industry—from the jurisdiction of 
counties, towns, and villages. The purpose of the Act as a whole is to (1) 
encourage oil and gas development and (2) protect persons and natural 
resources associated with oil and gas activities.164 As considered above, states 
have plenary authority, which means that they have jurisdiction over 
anything which is appropriate to civil government and which is not 
prohibited by the federal or state constitutions. For this statute to be 
unconstitutional, therefore, either its purpose must be prohibited, or its 
subject matter must fall outside the sphere of civil government.  
Before determining whether these sections of Act 13 are unconstitutional, 
it is important to first view them in the context of the framework of 
government established by the Pennsylvania Constitution. In its 
constitution, the People of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vested the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth in the General Assembly.165 All 
political subdivisions in Pennsylvania are “creations of the state with no 
powers of their own, except those powers expressly granted to them by the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth or by the General Assembly, and other 
authority implicitly necessary to carry into effect those express powers.”166 
The Pennsylvania Constitution permits municipalities to adopt home rule 
charters, which grant them a measure of self-governance, but that power is 
always limited explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution, by the charter 
itself, and by acts of the General Assembly.167 Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                        
 164. Act 13’s statement of purpose is contained in 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202, which 
states, 
The purposes of this chapter are to: 
(1) Permit optimal development of oil and gas resources of this Commonwealth 
consistent with protection of the health, safety, environment and property of 
Pennsylvania citizens. 
(2) Protect the safety of personnel and facilities employed in coal mining or 
exploration, development, storage and production of natural gas or oil. 
(3) Protect the safety and property rights of persons residing in areas where 
mining, exploration, development, storage or production occurs. 
(4) Protect the natural resources, environmental rights and values secured by the 
Constitution of Pennsylvania. 
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202. 
 165. PA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested 
in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”). 
 166. Fross v. Cty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1202 (Pa. 2011). 
 167. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and 
adopt home rule charters. Adoption, amendment or repeal of a home rule charter shall be by 
referendum. . . . A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or 
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Commonwealth can always take away power it has previously granted to the 
municipalities.168  
1. U.S. Constitution 
The first inquiry is to determine whether a statute governing oil and gas 
activities would violate the U.S. Constitution. The three portions of the 
Constitution relevant to this inquiry are sections 8 and 10 of Article I, and 
Amendment XIV. Act 13 implicates neither section 8 nor section 10.169  
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits states 
from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, 
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law, and from denying equal protection of law to any person within its 
jurisdiction.170 Act 13 violates neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
nor the Equal Protection clause.171  
                                                                                                                                        
perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the 
General Assembly at any time.”). 
 168. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009) (“Even 
where the state has granted powers to act in a particular field, moreover, such powers do not 
exist if the Commonwealth preempts the field.”).  
 169. Article 1, section 8 enumerates the specific powers of Congress. A state law violates 
that section if it seeks to regulate one of those fields of law. The only portion of section 8 that 
could possibly be relevant to the sections of Act 13 under review is the Commerce Clause, 
specifically, a doctrine known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause. This doctrine, implicit in 
the Commerce Clause, but first outlined by Justice Johnson’s concurring opinion in Gibbons 
v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), holds that a court may strike down a state law when it 
explicitly or implicitly regulates interstate commerce, since Congress alone has that authority. 
Here, removing the power of local municipalities to regulate oil and gas activities is clearly an 
intrastate matter, so section 3303 is not prohibited by Article 1, section 8. Article I, section 10 
specifically restricts the states’ power to engage in certain activities, such as entering into 
treaties, coining money, impairing the obligation of contracts, etc. None of these prohibitions 
is implicated by sections 3303 or 3304 of Act 13. 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. 
 171. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is not implicated here, because zoning laws are 
not among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. See, e.g., 16B AM. 
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 819 (2015) (listing rights of national citizenship recognized by 
various courts). The Equal Protection Clause enables the Federal government to intervene 
when a state denies a person or class of persons the same protection of law on the basis of some 
suspect category, such as race or religion. Act 13 would surely overcome minimal scrutiny, 
since unless a law discriminates on the basis of certain protected classes, modern 14th 
Amendment jurisprudence applies only a rational basis test. That test would be easily satisfied 
by this statute, given the Commonwealth’s interest in economic development. Considering 
the fact that Act 13 is highly favorable toward the oil and gas industry, suggesting a certain 
degree of legislative favoritism, the Equal Protection Clause would likely have had a far greater 
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The Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of the fundamental 
rights of life, liberty, and property, and is implicated when one of those rights 
is jeopardized. For over a century, though, the U.S. Supreme Court has found 
that there are certain other rights that are also fundamental since they are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”172 This concept is known as 
“substantive due process.” Although during the “Lochner Era” at the 
beginning of the 20th century, the Court recognized the right to contract as 
being a substantive due process right, the focus of current substantive due 
process jurisprudence is focused on privacy and intimate relationships. 
Depending on whether a fundamental right is restricted, courts will apply 
either minimal or heightened scrutiny to determine whether a challenged 
statute satisfies due process. In this case, the subject matter of the statute is 
zoning laws.  
Ordinarily, when a zoning ordinance is challenged, the issue is whether 
the challenged ordinance is essentially a taking under the Due Process clauses 
of the 5th and 14th Amendments; the challenger claims that his own property 
rights are being violated by the excessively restrictive zoning ordinance. 173 
Not so here. Instead, Pennsylvania removed the restrictions imposed by the 
local municipalities, and expanded the ability of landowners to engage in oil 
and gas activity on their properties. Since this is not a taking and does not 
violate the landowner’s due process rights, substantive or otherwise, Act 13 
survives a challenge under the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, both the 
commonwealth court and Justice Baer’s concurring opinion found that Act 
13 did violate the Due Process Clause.  
The due process argument proffered by the citizens in their challenge to 
Act 13 can be stated as a series of propositions: (1) property owners have a 
due process right to not be interfered with by the government or by 
neighbors; (2) municipalities have a constitutional duty to “preserve the 
character of neighborhoods”, etc.;174 (3) zoning ordinances are 
constitutionally necessary means by which to fulfill that duty; (4) 
municipalities have a constitutional obligation to enforce ordered zoning 
schemes; (5) Act 13 limits the ability of municipalities to zone in a way that 
“preserves” the community character; (6) Act 13 forces municipalities to 
                                                                                                                                        
significance if the U.S. Supreme Court treated economic rights with the same regard as 
individual civil rights. 
 172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (U.S. 1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(internal citation omitted).  
 173. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1004 (Pa. 2013) (Baer, J., 
concurring). 
 174. Id. (quoting City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1995)). 
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breach their constitutional responsibility; and (7) therefore, Act 13 
unconstitutionally violates property owners’ due process rights.  
As discussed above, a constitution does not itself grant rights, but instead 
provides a mechanism for protecting inherent human rights by dividing up 
government power and setting out how that power is administered. Both the 
plurality and the concurrence do violence to this principle. Uncomfortable 
with the notion that the Commonwealth could completely override the 
ability of local municipalities to limit industrial oil and gas activity on the 
local level and that Act 13 creates a one-size-fits-all rule for zoning, both 
opinions attempt to craft substantive grounds in the state or federal 
constitutions for why the state cannot remove zoning power from the 
municipalities.  
Justice Baer tried to find a substantive due process right to zoning 
ordinances that municipalities are bound to fulfill, and the state is bound to 
respect. Justice Baer’s argument is problematic because of (a) his faulty 
interpretation of the zoning cases, and (b) the structurally inconsistent result 
of that interpretation.  
First, Justice Baer interprets cases that describe the requirements for 
permissible zoning ordinances as inherently containing a constitutional right 
to have zoning ordinances.175 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.176 is the 
classic U.S. Supreme Court case that held a municipality may enact zoning 
ordinances as a valid exercise of its police power unless it is arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and bears “no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.”177 Baer reads the most famous portion of the 
opinion, which describes land uses that are not suited to the circumstances 
of the locality as a “pig in the parlor,”178 as being an implicit prohibition 
against the state changing the zoning scheme developed by a locality. Instead, 
Justice Sutherland is merely describing how the authority implementing a 
zoning ordinance is to determine whether there is nuisance that would 
warrant an exercise of the police power.179 Similarly, the passage Justice Baer 
cites from City of Edmonds v. Oxford House Inc. describes the purpose behind 
enacting zoning ordinances, but does not mandate them as a constitutional 
requirement.180 Indeed, of the cases Justice Baer cites for his view, only a New 
                                                                                                                                        
 175. Id. at 1006.  
 176. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1926). 
 177. Id. at 395 (internal citations omitted). 
 178. Id. at 388. 
 179. Id. at 387-88. 
 180. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1995). 
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York case, Cohen v. Board of Appeals of Village of Saddle Rock,181 suggests that 
the state could “impermissibly attempt to usurp the local zoning authority or 
violate home rule powers.”182 Even this language, though, does not establish 
a mandate on states and municipalities under the Due Process Clause to enact 
zoning ordinances to “vindicate the individual substantive due process rights 
of Pennsylvanian landowners.”183 
Second, having confused constitutional permissibility with a 
constitutional mandate, Justice Baer is confronted by structural 
inconsistency. Baer seems to argue that due process intrinsically requires 
zoning ordinances in order to protect property owners against neighbors’ 
obnoxious uses and to maintain order. If the state wants to occupy that whole 
field of regulation, it may do so as long as it complies with the constitutional 
requirements of the Euclid/Edmonds line of cases. But once the state 
legislature has given authority to the municipalities to promulgate zoning 
ordinances, as Pennsylvania did in its Municipal Planning Code (“MPC”), 
then Justice Baer would hold that “the state may not alter or invalidate those 
ordinances.” This position is untenable. If due process demands that 
municipalities enact zoning ordinances, independently of whether the state 
legislature has given or removed that authority, then that renders the 
constitution contradictory. This principle advocated by Justice Baer would 
strip the General Assembly of the power to preempt or place restrictions of 
any kind on a municipality’s “duty” to zone. Any ordinance that a city deems 
to be for the “best interests of the health, safety and character of their 
communit[y],” would be unassailable under Justice Baer’s view because the 
state would be attempting to take back a right it has previously conferred and 
which its citizens have subsequently relied on. Furthermore, wouldn’t it also 
be a due process violation if the city itself repealed a zoning ordinance that 
the citizens had formerly relied on? And how are we to know if a particular 
zoning scheme or ordinance has reached the constitutionally untouchable 
level? Clearly, having found a right where none exists, Justice Baer paves the 
way for a substantive due process issue in the most mundane of zoning 
situations. It would be far better to just accept that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to allow or disallow 
municipalities to enact zoning ordinances.184 
                                                                                                                                        
 181. Cohen v. Bd. of Appeals of Village of Saddle Rock, 795 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 624 (“Localities remain free to enact zoning regulations in the best interests of 
the health, safety and character of their communities.”). 
 183. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1002. 
 184. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“Municipalities shall have the right and power to 
frame and adopt home rule charters. Adoption, amendment or repeal of a home rule charter 
shall be by referendum. . . . A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any 
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2. Pennsylvania Constitution and General Principles of Law 
Once a state statute has cleared the hurdles posed by the United States 
Constitution, the next step of analysis is to determine whether there are any 
prohibitions against it in the state constitution or in the general principles of 
law.185 For this step, the subject matter of Act 13 is the regulation of the oil 
and gas industry.186 After determining whether the constitution authorizes 
regulation of this subject matter it will be necessary to discern the purposes 
of Act 13, and determine whether those purposes are consistent with the 
constitution and whether the means employed by the statute are calculated 
to effect those purposes.  
a. Subject Matter and Purposes 
The first and primary subject matter of this statute is the regulation of oil 
and gas extraction and production activities. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
does not contain an express or implicit prohibition against the legislature’s 
regulation of oil and gas extraction and production activities.187 Furthermore, 
since state governments, unlike the federal government, have general power 
rather than enumerated power, the presumption is that the state has the 
jurisdiction to regulate for the purpose of health, safety, welfare, or morals 
unless the federal or state constitution provides otherwise.188 Thus, while the 
Pennsylvania Constitution does not have to enumerate a power of the 
Commonwealth to regulate oil and gas activities, the Pennsylvania legislature 
may legislate in that area as part of its plenary power—as long as it is for a 
proper purpose and does not adopt means which violate the constitution.  
As for the Laws of nature and of nature’s God, the purpose of civil 
government is to protect the life, liberty, and property of those within its 
                                                                                                                                        
power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by 
the General Assembly at any time.”); Fross v. Cty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1202 (Pa. 2011).  
 185. These general principles are the higher law on which all law depends, and are known 
in the Declaration of Independence as “The Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 186. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201 (“This chapter relates to oil and gas.”). 
 187. See generally PA. CONST.  
 188. See, e.g., Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 842 A.2d 936, 945 (Pa. 2004) (“One 
of the most important functions of government, as previously set forth by this Court, is: ‘[T]he 
exercise of the police power for the purpose of preserving the public health, safety and morals, 
and it is true that, to accomplish that purpose, the legislature may limit the enjoyment of 
personal liberty and property.’”) (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 636-37 
(Pa. 1954)). 
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jurisdiction.189 This is, of course, the purpose as viewed at a high level of 
generalization. If the government exceeds those purposes, then it has 
exceeded the bounds of its authority and has, to use Locke’s term, devolved 
into tyranny.190  
Turning to the purposes of the statute, section 3202 delineates the 
purposes of Act 13, which are, of course, the purposes of §§ 3303 and 3304. 
Those purposes were to:  
(1) Permit optimal development of oil and gas resources of this 
Commonwealth consistent with protection of the health, safety, 
environment and property of Pennsylvania citizens. 
(2) Protect the safety of personnel and facilities employed in coal 
mining or exploration, development, storage and production of 
natural gas or oil. 
(3) Protect the safety and property rights of persons residing in 
areas where mining, exploration, development, storage or 
production occurs. 
(4) Protect the natural resources, environmental rights and values 
secured by the Constitution of Pennsylvania.191  
It is clear that the first three purposes of the statute are proper under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, since they aim to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of those involved in the oil and gas industry. Thus, they fall within 
                                                                                                                                        
 189. See Romans 13:1-5. See also R.J. RUSHDOONY, LAW AND LIBERTY 7 (1984) (“The 
purpose of Biblical law, and all laws grounded on a Biblical faith, is to punish and restrain evil, 
and to protect life and property, to provide justice for all people.”); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 123-24 (digitized by The University of Adelaide) (1690) 
(“IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own 
person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his 
freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul 
[sic] of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature 
he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the 
invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part 
no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is 
very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, 
is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is 
willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the 
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, 
property. . . . The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and 
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the 
state of nature there are many things wanting.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 
(U.S. 1776).  
 190. LOCKE, supra note 189, at §§ 199-202. 
 191. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202. 
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the plenary police power of the state. The fourth purpose is constitutional 
because it links the purpose of Act 13 to the rights delineated in the E.R.A.192  
Likewise, using the broadly defined purposes of civil government given 
above, the first three purposes of Act 13 comport with purposes of civil 
government found in the general principles of law: the protection of life, 
liberty, and property. The first purpose, which is to “permit optimal 
development of oil and gas resources” doesn’t actually entail action or 
exercise of power on the part of the state, but rather self-restraint in order to 
encourage private industry. The next two purposes aim to protect the lives 
and property of persons associated with or impacted by the oil and gas 
industry. It is much less clear to what extent the protection of natural 
resources or “environmental rights” is a proper purpose of the civil 
government.193 If the purpose, though, is to implement “government-
initiated management of the environment,” then it would seem that 
regardless of whether such management is authorized by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, it is a breach of the jurisdiction of civil government.194 This 
Note assumes, however, that some level of regulation for the purpose of 
environmental protection—e.g., to prevent the pollution of air or water—
does properly fall within the sphere of the civil government, especially when 
it relates to the public health.195 
b.  Means 
Once it has been determined that the statute was enacted for proper 
purposes, the focus of the analysis shifts to the means adopted by the statute 
to accomplish those purposes. The goal is to discover whether there is a 
“nexus” between the means taken by the statute and the purpose for which it 
                                                                                                                                        
 192. Cf. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (The “Environmental Rights Amendment”). 
 193. I leave it to the symposium speakers to discuss the legitimacy of environmental law in 
the context of the Law of Nature and of Nature’s God. It is sufficient for my purposes to 
recognize that this is a necessary consideration for a court to make when evaluating the validity 
of a statute in light of general principles of law.  
 194. The Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, THE CORNWALL DECLARATION 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP, http://www.cornwallalliance.org/docs/the-cornwall-
declaration-on-environmental-stewardship.pdf (last accessed Feb. 5, 2016). Just because an 
action is condoned by a constitution does not mean it comports with general principles of law. 
For example, if the state constitution provides that the state legislature shall take all firstborn 
daughters and sell them to China to repay the state’s debts, that action would be constitutional, 
but it would not be lawful according to the Law of Nature and of Nature’s God.  
 195. For an example of some case laws in the Mosaic law with a potentially environmental 
or public health purpose, see Deuteronomy 23:12-14 (covering of excrement), Leviticus 14:33-
57 (cleansing and quarantine of diseased houses), and Deuteronomy 20:19-20 (conservation of 
fruit-bearing trees).  
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was enacted. If no nexus exists, or if it is so attenuated as to be merely a 
pretext for some other purpose, then the statute is unconstitutional. 
Additionally, the means must not be prohibited by the constitution or by the 
Law of Nature and of Nature’s God.  
The means adopted in both §§ 3303 and 3304 to accomplish the purposes 
of Act 13 was to remove specific types of regulation from the control of 
municipalities.196 Section 3303 made environmental acts, insofar as they 
regulated oil and gas operations, purely a state matter and preempted the 
“entire field of regulation.”197 Section 3304 restricted local municipal zoning 
authority to only enact ordinances that allowed for “reasonable development 
of oil and gas resources,” and then went on to define such reasonable 
development by limiting the permissible scope of the ordinances that a 
municipality could pass.198  
The first question is whether these means are “calculated to effect” the 
purposes of Act 13.199 The issue here is simply determining whether the 
legislature adopted these means to accomplish the purpose of the statute, or 
whether the stated purpose was merely a pretext and the means employed 
were aimed toward a different object altogether. In considering this question, 
it is important to be reminded of the nature of judicial reasoning. It is not the 
role of the court to determine whether the legislature used the best means 
possible—that would be an exercise of political reasoning. The job of the 
court is to decide whether the means were legal. 200 Given the stated purposes 
of Act 13, there is no evidence that preempting the field and specifying the 
scope of zoning ordinances is a pretext for any purpose other than to “permit 
optimal development of oil and gas resources.”201 
The next inquiry is to determine whether there are constitutional 
prohibitions against the means adopted in these two sections. The answer is 
no. Again, it is essential to keep in mind the purpose and function of a 
constitution. As detailed above, municipalities in Pennsylvania are creatures 
of the Commonwealth. Counties, towns, and villages only exist at the behest 
of the General Assembly. If the People of the Commonwealth wished to 
structure the relationship between the state and local governments 
differently, it was, and is, in their power to do so. The Constitution may be 
                                                                                                                                        
 196. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 and 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304. 
 197. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303. 
 198. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304. 
 199. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (U.S. 1819). 
 200. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1009-10 (Pa. 2013) (Saylor, J., 
dissenting). 
 201. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202. 
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amended to reorder the division of power. Under the current regime, 
however, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has authority under the 
Constitution to remove power from the local municipalities.202 The removal 
of local power was the means that the General Assembly chose to use to 
accomplish the purposes of Act 13. If those are legitimate objects, and we’ve 
seen that they are, and the means are not a pretext, then the judiciary does 
not have the right to say whether the means chosen were the best possible. 
The plurality, however, spent a great deal of space arguing that Article 1, 
§ 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution—the E.R.A.—was just such a 
prohibition. The E.R.A. prohibited § 3303, because it forced municipalities 
to violate the amendment, and it prohibited § 3304 because the uniform 
regulatory scheme would itself be a degradation of the trust corpus. 
The plurality effectively argues that the court has broader judicial review 
of the General Assembly’s actions when the legislature is acting as a trustee 
than when the General Assembly is acting as a legislature, since it can 
overrule a statute for violating the trust that would otherwise be 
constitutional.203  This is an extraordinary grant of power to the judiciary and 
fundamentally changes the nature of the relationship between two branches 
of government. The plurality’s interpretation would make the legislature 
accountable to the supervision of the courts and would ignore the fact that 
the legislature is principally accountable to the citizens who elect it to office. 
But even aside from this startling implication of the public trust doctrine, 
striking down the statutes on the trust theory is problematic for a relatively 
technical flaw that is inherent in the very idea of enforcing the E.R.A. like a 
common law trust, which Justice Castille strenuously tried to do in the 
plurality opinion.204 The issue is that this so-called trust violates the legal 
                                                                                                                                        
 202. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009) (“Even 
where the state has granted powers to act in a particular field, moreover, such powers do not 
exist if the Commonwealth preempts the field.”). 
 203. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 975 (“But, in this litigation, the citizens’ constitutional 
challenge is not to the General Assembly’s power to enact such legislation; that is a power the 
General Assembly unquestionably possesses. The question arising from the Commonwealth’s 
litigation stance is whether the General Assembly can perform the legislative function in a 
manner inconsistent with the constitutional mandate [to act as trustee].”). 
 204. Id. at 956 (“[The third clause of Section 27] establishes the public trust doctrine with 
respect to these natural resources (the corpus of the trust), and designates ‘the 
Commonwealth’ as trustee and the people as the named beneficiaries. The terms of the trust 
are construed according to the intent of the settlor which, in this instance, is ‘the people.’”). 
See id. (“‘Trust’ and ‘trustee’ are terms of art that carried legal implications well developed at 
Pennsylvania law at the time the amendment was adopted.”); id. (“This environmental public 
trust was created by the people of Pennsylvania, as the common owners of the 
Commonwealth’s public natural resources; this concept is consistent with the ratification 
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structure of a trust, because “the creator, trustee, and beneficiary are all one 
in the same:”205 the People of Pennsylvania. Thus, simply on the basis of 
ordinary trust law, this environmental trust is unenforceable. 
In addressing § 3303 and 3304, what the plurality has done is said that the 
constitutional mandate applies not just to the General Assembly, but also to 
municipalities. Under this interpretation, the General Assembly is violating 
the Constitution by prohibiting the local government from carrying out their 
supposed constitutional duties. The problem with that, however, is that the 
towns and villages only have the duty to uphold the Constitution while they 
possess authority granted by the General Assembly. Once that authority is 
removed, then the local governments no longer have the power or the duty 
to uphold the Constitution. There is an agency relationship between the 
General Assembly and the local governments, so the primary constitutional 
duty falls on the principal—the General Assembly. The General Assembly 
has chosen to delegate some of that authority to the local governments, but it 
may withdraw that authority when it sees fit to do so.  
The plurality, however, is essentially saying that the Constitution requires 
the General Assembly to grant certain powers to the local municipalities. This 
would fundamentally alter the creator/creature distinction between the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and her municipalities that the people of the 
Commonwealth judged best at the time the Pennsylvania Constitution was 
enacted. If the people wish to strengthen the power of their municipalities to 
make these sorts of decisions, then the people should amend the constitution. 
The court has no business doing so.  
                                                                                                                                        
process of the constitutional amendment delineating the terms of the trust. The 
Commonwealth is named trustee and, notably, duties and powers attendant to the trust are 
not vested exclusively in any single branch of Pennsylvania’s government.”). 
 205. James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45 
ENVTL. L. 337, 368 (2015) (“[T]he public trust doctrine cannot be explained or understood as 
a branch of the law of trusts. While we might describe the government as trustee holding legal 
title and the public as beneficiary holding equitable title, we will search in vain for a creator 
who, under trusts law, cannot be either the trustee or the beneficiary. Without a creator, we 
cannot know the terms of the trust. In a government founded on popular sovereignty, where 
sovereignty implies exclusive jurisdiction over (rather than title to) the geographic territory of 
the state or nation, the only possible creator of a trust with respect to resources within that 
territory is the sovereign people. But under the trust law theory of the public trust doctrine, 
the people are the beneficiary. And in a democratic republic the people are also the trustee 
acting through the agency of elected officials.”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
When a court strays from the basic principles of judicial reasoning and the 
underlying structure of a constitution system, it will inevitably fall prey to 
convoluted reasoning and black-robed legislating. It is understandable that 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may have disagreed with the sweeping 
overhaul of the Commonwealth’s oil and gas law, but the proper solution 
would have been for the public to petition the General Assembly to change 
course. Finding illusory constitutional rights and transforming the General 
Assembly into a trustee in order to stave off a feared environmental disaster 
has simply polluted the water for those downstream.  
